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to	 the	great	differences	 in	 the	 interests	of	 individual	 countries.	 In	2009,	
Vladimir	Putin,	who	was	then	the	Russian	prime	minister,	gave	a	success-
ful	 impetus	 for	 establishing	 closer	 relations	within	 a	 still	narrow	group	
of	three	countries:	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus.	With	determination,	
Russia	embarked	upon	implementing	the	principles	of	the	Customs	Union	















































































However,	 too	 many	 factors	 were	 working	 against	 the	 integration	 process.	
It	was	initiated	by	Russia,	which	had	from	the	very	beginning	aspired	to	play	


















































































Agreements	 and	Deep	 and	Comprehensive	 Trade	Area	 agreements	 (DCFTA)	
with	those	eastern	partners	who	had	made	the	most	progress	in	their	reform	
processes	 (Ukraine	and	Moldova	were	 the	first	 to	 start	 this	process).	Russia	

















Secondly,	Russia	made	clear	concessions	 to	 its	partners	 in	 its	effort	 to	make	
them	 genuinely	 interested	 in	 implementing	 the	 agreements.	 Moscow	 used	
the	conditionality	principle	in	this	case	as	well,	but	it	also	used	the	principle	
of	greater	symmetry	of	benefits.	The	impression	could	have	been	gained	that	
Russia	was	 ready	 to	 incur	 significant	but	 temporary	 economic	 costs	 to	 gain	
long-term	political	benefits.	
Thirdly,	unlike	before,	efforts	were	made	 to	ensure	 that	 the	CU	agreements	
were	based	to	a	greater	extent	on	international	standards.	In	particular,	Mos-
cow	forced	 its	partners	de facto to	accept	 that	 the	provisions	of	 the	Customs	






















This	 text	 is	 an	attempt	 to	 sum	up	 the	progress	which	has	 so	 far	been	made	
in	 implementing	 the	 integration	 initiative	 announced	 by	Vladimir	 Putin	 in	
2009.	The	chapters	of	this	work	provide	an	outline	of	the	following	elements:	

















I. The assumpTIons of The InTegraTIon InITIaTIve  
of november 2009









apply	 in	 the	 three	countries	on	1	 January	2010	(for	 the	first	 time	since	 1991).	










The customs union was just the first stage in the process of these coun-
tries’ integration. In 2010, the parties agreed to form the common eco-
nomic space between 1 January 2012 and the end of 2015, and signed sev-





























2. The principles of the integration process of belarus, Kazakhstan 
and russia 
2.1. Integration as part of the customs union
As	the	principles	of	the	Customs	Union	were	being	introduced,	barriers	were	
also	being	lifted	(with	some	exceptions,	mainly	concerning	oil	trade)	in	inter-
nal	 trade	between	these	countries	within	 the	 free	 trade	zone.	Furthermore,	


































































insufficient	 quantities.	 However,	 a	 decidedly	more	 important	 limitation	 for	



















oil	supplies	 to	Belarus	which	are	not	 intended	for	 the	needs	of	 this	country.	
Since	2012,	only	oil	supplied	via	pipelines	to	the	Customs	Union	member	states	
is	duty-free	 (customs	duty	 should	be	 imposed	on	oil	 transported	by	 railway	
cisterns).	Furthermore,	Russia	has	promised	to	impose	customs	duty	on	all	oil	
sent	to	Kazakhstan	starting	from	2014.	
The	entry	into	force	of	the	common customs code (CCC)	in	all	three	mem-
ber	states	has	been	of	key	significance	for	the	operation	of	the	Customs	Un-
ion.	This	document	set	the	same	rules	for	the	member	states	regarding	the	





of	 goods	 supplied	 from	outside	 the	Customs	Union,	 reduced	 the	 clearance	
time	and	the	number	of	required	documents.	When	the	CCC	started	to	apply	






























































































5	percentage	points	above	 the	price	 level	 in	 the	member	state	where	 the	
inflation	is	lowest.	Officially,	these	parameters	becomes	binding	in	2013,	al-
though	all	three	countries	had	already	met	these	conditions	in	2011;	
•	 the operation and access to the services provided by selected natural 












12	 Решение Коллегии Евразийской экономической комиссии от 5 февраля 2013 г. N 14 
„О реа лизации Соглашения о единых принципах и правилах регулирования деятель-




















•	 government subsidies for industry and agriculture:	 the	parties	have	
divided	the	industrial	subsidies	into	three	types:	specific	(these	are	admis-





















ble	 to	 derogate	 from	 these	 rules	 for	 a	 period	 not	 longer	 than	 2	 years.	
National	 rules	 are	 expected	 to	 apply	 to	 entities	 from	other	CES	 coun-
tries	 (operation	 on	 the	 same	 conditions	 as	 domestic	 companies)	 from	
1	January	2014;	
















maritime	 transport,	and	pipeline	 transport13.	Foreign	 investors’	 share	 in	
the	telecommunication	services	and	air	transport	sectors	has	been	restrict-
ed	to	49%	of	the	market,	and	their	share	in	the	mass	media	to	20%.	Nor	will	
the	market	 for	 lawyer	or	notary	services	be	subject	 to	 integration	 (those	
who	offer	such	services	must	be	citizens	of	a	given	country).	Furthermore,	
each	of	the	states	can	also	lengthen	the	list	of	exceptions	individually;	
•	 the rules of intellectual property protection:	the	rules	being	introduced	








The free movement of capital and the common currency policy







































promised	 by	 the	 parties.	A	 decision	 of	August	 2011	 imposed	 the	 obligation	
upon	the	parties	to	inform	each	other	of	the	export	and	import	of	petroleum	
products.	The	parties	also	agreed	that	petrol	and	diesel	oil	requirements	and	





planned	by	 the	 end	of	 2012.	The	parties’	 arrangements	 concerning	 the	gas	
sector	signify	that	only	the	procedure	for	determining	the	gas	price	will	be	
established.	Access	to	the	transport	network	is	expected	to	be	ensured	only	




The free movement of labour
The	parties	have	decided	to	join	efforts	to	counteract	illegal	migration	of	work-
ers	from	third	countries	and	to	determine	the	legal	status	of	expatriate	workers	












































food.	 In	April	 2011,	 the	parties	 further	agreed	on	 the	procedures	 to	 confirm	




and	 declaration	 registration	 forms	were	 introduced	 within	 the	 CU	 in	mid-
2011.	31	technical	regulations	(out	of	the	66	needed)	took	effect	by	April	2013.	
The	effective	dates	of	 the	 remaining	ones	have	been	postponed	until	 as	 late	
17	 W.	Ioncew...,	Yedinyi	rynok	truda	YeEP:	ekonomicheskyi	efekt	soglashenyi	v	oblasti	 tru-































































































































nomic	 Space28.	 This	 commission	 replaced	 the	 previously	 operating	 Customs	
















pervising	 compliance	with	 technical,	 sanitary	&	phytosanitary	 regulations,	
distribution	of	the	income	from	customs	duty,	and	setting	the	rules	of	trade	
co-operation	 with	 third	 countries	 (all	 these	 functions	 had	 previously	 been	
performed	 by	 the	 Customs	 Union	 Commission).	 As	 integration	 of	 the	 three	
states	deepens,	the	Commission’s	competences	will	be	gradually	expanded,	to	
28	 Agreement	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	of	18	November	2011;	http://www.tsouz.






































































Disputes	within	 the	Customs	Union	 and	 the	CES	 are	 resolved	 by	 the	 judges	


























II. The basIc InTeresTs of The presenT  
and poTenTIal parTIcIpanTs In The InTegraTIon 
process





1. regional integration: russian interests vs. those of selected 

































































Russian	goods	on	 this	market.	Ensuring	an	outlet	 (even	 if	a	 relatively	small	


















































Kazakhstan sees	 regional	 integration	 in	political	 terms.	Co-operation	with	



































































the	 intensification	 of	 economic	 relations	 between	 Kazakhstan	 and	 Belarus.	
The	reasons	for	this	include	the	geographical	distance	between	the	two	econo-
mies,	infrastructural	limitations,	the	unattractive	trade	offer,	and	strong	com-






has	many	 instruments	 for	putting	pressure	on	Minsk,	which	 it	has	used	on	
















































































































































turers	 to	 become	 especially	 interested	 in	 good	 relations	with	Russia,	which	














from	 the	 EU,	which	 is	what	 the	Ukrainian	 government	 is	 trying	 to	 avoid38.	





































cessions	 by	 introducing	 transitional	 periods	 for	 some	 goods	 (used	 cars	 and	
pharmaceuticals)	and	allowing	individual	persons	to	bring	up	to	50	kg	of	goods	
for	their	private	needs40.


















































Astana	 agreed	 in	 June	 2012	 to	 supply	 Russia	with	 2	million	 tonnes	 of	 oil	 as	









44	 Until	 2012,	 Astana	 imported	 approximately	 7	 million	 tonnes	 of	 oil	 duty-free	 from	 Rus-
sia.	This	primarily	 concerns	northern	Kazakhstan,	where	 connection	 to	 the	Kazakh	 re-
sources	via	the	transport	network	is	lacking.	Above	all,	this	concerns	the	Pavlodar	refin-
ery,	to	which	oil	from	Russia	was	supplied	via	the	pipeline,	as	well	as	many	small	refineries	



















The economic ratios of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2012
russia Kazakhstan belarus




















































































III. The economIc consequences and possIble fuTure 
developmenTs of The InTegraTIon process
1. economic effects of integration
1.1. for its participants











An	 intensified	 influx	 of	 Russian	 entities	 to	 Kazakhstan	 has	 been	 observed	
since	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Customs	 Union.	 The	 number	 of	 firms	 with	
Russian	 capital	 in	 2012	 increased	 by	 80%,	 exceeding	 900047.	 These	 are	 usu-
ally	firms	 from	Russian	 frontier	 regions,	 for	example	 from	the	agricultural,	
food	and	machine-building	sectors,	which	take	advantage	of	 less	bureaucra-





1.2. for third-party countries
The	creation	of	the	Customs	Union	between	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus	
has	raised	the	customs	duties	on	some	goods	from	third-party	countries.	The	








































Furthermore,	 lifting	barriers	 in	 internal	 trade	between	Russia,	Belarus	and	




























The	 integration	process	will	 continue,	but	delays	 can	be	 expected	 in	 its	 im-
plementation.	It	is	also	doubtful	whether	it	will	be	possible	(and	if	so,	in	what	






















It	 also	appears	 that	Russia	has	 sufficient	 instruments	 (for	example,	 control-






















It can already be observed that the Kremlin’s political will to implement 
the integration process, which arose in 2009 partly because russia had 
been very severely affected by the economic crisis, is gradually weaken-
ing. russia is not ready to make compromises and concessions on the is-
sues which are vital for it, such as those concerning the energy sector. 
In effect, the integration is proving to be fragmentary, and covers only 
selected sectors of the economies involved in the process. additionally, 
more and more negative consequences of establishing closer co-operation 
as part of the cu and ces are being revealed, especially for Kazakhstan. 
furthermore, when the integration process is expanded to include issues 
which go beyond trade and economy, like the anti-trust policy or setting 
the domestic prices of energy carriers, the leaders of Kazakhstan and 
belarus tend to distance themselves. as a result, the integration has lost 
its initial momentum over the past few months. 
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